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ABSTRACT
Distance-bounding protocols were introduced in 1993 as a coun-
termeasure to relay attacks, in which an adversary fraudulently
forwards the communication between a verifier and a distant prover.
In the more than 40 different protocols that followed, assumptions
were taken on the structure of distance-bounding protocols and
their threat models. In this paper, we survey works disrupting these
assumptions, and discuss the remaining challenges.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In relay attacks, an adversary forwards back and forth the commu-
nications between a a verifier (e.g., an RFID reader) and a prover
(e.g., an RFID card) found outside the verifier’s range; the adversary
does this in a fraudulent manner, in order to gain illicit access to
a service. Distance-bounding (DB) protocols were introduced by
Brands and Chaum in 1993 to counteract relay attacks. In these
protocols a verifier measures the round-trip times (RTTs) of its
exchanges with a prover, to estimate the distance between the two;
if the RTTs are greater than a certain threshold, then relay attacks
are probable and the verifier rejects the transaction. Relay attacks
against contactless payments [36] triggered Mastercard to add relay
protection through distance bounding [20]; so, after 25 years of
research, distance bounding is finally adopted by the industry.
The threats [4] considered in “academic” distance bounding are:
Mafia Fraud (MF). Two collaborating adversaries impersonate a
distant prover in front of a verifier. Typically, one of the adversaries
presents a fake verifier to the victim prover, while the other presents
a fake prover to the legitimate verifier.
Distance Fraud (DF). A distant dishonest prover authenticates
from afar by misleading the verifier in its measurements.
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Distance Hijacking (DH). Distance hijacking is a generalisa-
tion of distance fraud; in a DF, no prover is close to the verifier,
whereas in a DH, honest provers are to be found close to the verifier.
Terrorist Fraud (TF).A distant prover, helped by an accomplice
located close to the verifier, tries to authenticate. To exclude trivial
attacks where the prover gives his secret key to his accomplice,
the fraud is considered successful only if the accomplice cannot
authenticate on his own, once the prover no longer helps him.
A wide range of variations of these attacks have appeared, e.g.,
see [14]. Indeed, the threat model for DB is in constant evolu-
tion [23], and new attacks appear regularly: [4, 11] present more
than 40 protocols, most of which are vulnerable to at least one at-
tack. In particular, the notion of terrorist fraud and how to provably
resist it lead to numerous publications, e.g., [5, 21, 24, 39].
Contributions.
1. We critically survey works that, in a quest for better results, have
challenged the well-established assumptions in distance-bounding.
2. We discuss what could be achieved by lifting more assumptions.
2 DISRUPTING CLASSICAL ASSUMPTIONS
The main assumptions for academic distance-bounding protocols
were introduced in [10] and further extended in [15]. They are
mostly related to physical-layer constraints to obtain reliable time
measurements. Following these assumptions, most protocols are
divided in two: a). a phase which is not time-critical and bares
hardly any restrictions; b) a timed phase, inwhich 1-bit messages are
exchanged and no expensive computation can be is performed. This
section surveys approaches that bypass traditional assumptions.
Assumption 1: Single-bit challenges and responses. During
the timed phases, only single-bit messages should be exchanged.
This assumption has been widely adopted in most academic
distance-bounding protocols, except for a few exceptions, such
as [31]. The assumption is however challenged by practical imple-
mentations: new relay-counteractions by 3DB [16], Mastercard’s
relay resistance protocol [20] and NXP’s distance-bounding proto-
col [37]. These practical protocols share a similar design: during
the timed phase, the verifier sends a bitstring nonce and the prover
replies with another bitstring nonce. Afterwards, the prover sends
a message authenticating the transcript (including both nonces),
either via a signature or a MAC.
Assumption 2: Error tolerance. Distance-bounding protocols
must account for the bit errors that occur during the timed phases.
Tolerance of transmission-errors is typically provided by grant-
ing authentication even if not all responses are correct, but no more
than a given proportion/number are incorrect. Yet, enforcing such
tolerances generally lowers DB security. For instance, the DB3 pro-
tocol [24] with noise tolerance generally requires 43 rounds for
a security-level equivalent to 20 rounds of its noiseless version.
Moreover, it was shown that noise-tolerance lead to terrorist frauds
on some protocols that were otherwise secure [22].
1
WiSec ’19, May 15–17, 2019, Miami, FL, USA Boureanu and Gerault
Moreover, the need for error tolerance was traditionally argued
in relation to specific physical implementations and 1-bit messages.
Yet, the new bit-encoding used in the distance-bounding system pro-
posed by 3DB [16] eliminates transmission errors, and their physical
layer securely uses multiple-bit challenges and responses [35].
Assumption 3: Honest Verifiers. The verifiers are always honest.
Traditional computational formal models [9, 19] exclude mali-
cious verifiers. Yet, in contactless payments for instance, the veri-
fiers should be considered (at least in part) dishonest – as malware-
infected payment terminals exist [32]. Indeed, recent Dolev-Yao [18]-
based models for formal verification [14, 17, 29] as well as crypto-
graphic formalisms [26] relax this assumption. And, indeed, con-
sidering dishonest verifiers lead to new attacks [29] on otherwise-
secure protocols such as TREAD [5].
Assumption 4: Broadcastmessages.Messages are broadcast and
can all be read by DB-driven adversaries.
On the one hand, this assumption can be bypassed through
the use of directional antennas [2]. On the other, leveraging this
possibility, Ahmadi et al. [2] exhibit terrorist frauds against existing
protocols, which were otherwise secure.
Assumption 5: Unilateral (Fixed) Timing. Challenges are sent
at fixed time intervals. Only verifiers measure time, provers do not.
First, there are no more than 4 protocols [6, 12] in the vast DB lit-
erature in which both parties mutually verify their relative distance.
Second, in the first DB paper [10], the idea of the verifier sending
the challenges at varying intervals was mentioned. This was revis-
ited in [27]. To this end, [27] proposes two main extensions to the
DBopt protocols [24]: 1). the prover measures the time at which it
received a challenge; 2) the verifier sends challenges at randomised
intervals. Third, randomised challenge-sending intervals improve
resistance to distance fraud [24]: if a prover sends his response
before receiving the challenge, he cannot be sure his response will
arrive after the challenge is issued. And, adding time-measurements
by the prover and including them in the final authenticated message
improves mafia-fraud resistance [24]. Using both strategies together
allows to significantly reduce the number of rounds required for
the DBopt protocols to be secure.
Assumption 6: Relevance of Terrorist Fraud.Many discussed
provable terrorist-fraud resistance: e.g. [5, 9, 21, 39].
Yet, provable terrorist-fraud resistance typically lowers the over-
all security of the protocols [24]. The relevance of terrorist-fraud
resistance was also questioned many times over the years, in par-
ticular, because of the assumption that the prover does not want to
reveal his secret key to his accomplice. If he trusts the accomplice
enough to let him authenticate once, then why would he not trust
him to delete the information he learnt after the protocol? Actually,
a recent article [8] shows that terrorist-fraud resistance is in fact
irrelevant, under the assumption that tamper-proof devices can
be built. Two cases are identified by [8]. One, the prover does not
know his secret key (black-box model) and therefore he cannot
meaningfully help an accomplice. Or, the prover knows his secret
key (white-box model) and so he can build a full tamper-proof,
single-use copy of his device and give it to his accomplice; the ac-
complice authenticates once with this device, and does not learn
any additional information as the device is tamper-proof and it is
built to wipe its memory after one authentication.
Assumption 7: Use of Cryptographic Keys. The vast majority
of existing distance-bounding protocols rely on cryptographic keys
as a means of authentication.
Two DB protocols [25, 28] use physically uncloneable functions
(PUFs) instead. The advantage is that, contrary to a cryptographic
key, a PUF is designed to be untransferable. However, dishon-
est provers can bypass PUFs’ untransferability (in the BadPUF
model [33]). This limits the interest of using PUFs instead of keys
in distance bounding, where dishonest provers are customary.
3 GOING FURTHER
We now move on from debatable assumptions to future endeavours.
Dishonest provers. Security properties related to dishonest provers
do not seem to be a priority for real-life distance-bounding applica-
tions. In particular, the protocols by NXP and Mastercard are both
vulnerable to distance fraud, distance hijacking and terrorist fraud:
a dishonest, far away prover can send his response in advance, since
the latter is independent of the challenge.
We believe these attacks should be considered seriously by the
industry. For instance, imagine a military facility: the people inside
have access to real-time, sensitive information through amobile app.
A verifier uses (authenticated) distance bounding, to give access to
the app only to people who are inside the facility. Now assume a
secret meeting occurs inside this facility. It should be impossible
for someone not invited to the meeting to have access to the data
exchanged via the app. However, if the DB protocol is vulnerable
to distance fraud, or distance hijacking, a malicious user can access
the app from outside the building. Similarly, assume the app grants
different levels of privilege and information, depending on the rank
of the user: if a malicious general is not invited to the meeting, he
could perform a terrorist fraud with the help of a lower-ranked
accomplice (e.g., a security guard), and allow this accomplice to
have access to information that he is not allowed to see.
In the case of payment systems, distance fraud should also be
counteracted, as it could be used by a criminal to obtain an alibi.
They could use a distance fraud to pay for goods in a shop, while
they are actually somewhere else committing a crime; the payment
log from the shop’s terminal would make them appear innocent.
Distance-fraud counteraction in contactless payments is even more
acutely called for by the fact that recent proposals [38] enforce
proximity-checks be added to banks’ payment-logs as well.
No Tamper-proof Devices and Terrorist Fraud. In the previ-
ous section, we mentioned that terrorist-fraud resistance could be
ignored in distance bounding. However, this only holds if tamper-
proof devices can be built (otherwise, the strategy for terrorist-fraud
resistance described in [8] does not work). Without tamper-proof
devices, we are back to needing terrorist-fraud resistance. This
brings us to questioning an implicit assumption made in terrorist-
fraud resistant protocols: the accomplice A follows the instructions
of the prover P∗. However, if theA deviates from the instructions of
P∗, he can sometimes obtain the possibility to authenticate later. For
instance, consider the directional attacks proposed in [2], in which
the terrorist fraud succeeds only because P∗ can use a directional
antenna to send the verifier a message that A cannot read. If A
can read this message, then he could authenticate on his own later,
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and the terrorist fraud would therefore be unsuccessful. Hence, the
attack can work only ifA complies with staying in a position where
the messages sent through the directional antenna cannot reach
him. Yet, A does not have to be in the line-of-sight between P∗ and
the verifier: he could simply hide a receiver near the verifier, and
read the directional message afterwards. From this, a new research
direction possibly arises: should a terrorist-fraud accomplice A be
considered as executing an algorithm predefined by his helper P∗, or
not? Similarly, if P∗ choses the algorithm run byA, can a third-party
adversary obtain information during the attack?
Moreover, the recent formalism in [14] mentions a variation of
terrorist fraud, in which the accomplice is a legitimate prover, hold-
ing a valid key. To what extent does this affect existing protocols?
Multiple Verifiers. Academic DB protocols consider that a prover
authenticates to a single verifier at a time. On the one hand, when
tackling distance fraud, it is natural to ask whether multiple veri-
fiers could aid. That is, the prover could be placed in the middle of
several verifiers, each of them performing the same measurements
simultaneously and comparing the results. For such a countermea-
sure, a different threat model is required: it should consider provers
with multiple devices at different locations. On the other, multiple
verifiers performing time-measurements at the same time may not
(easily) help against terrorist fraud. Yet, DB protocols with more
than two parties were proposed in the literature: e.g., [13].
Non-Identifiable Devices and Provers. The very principle of re-
lay attacks requires that the adversary can present a fraudulent
device that looks like a legitimate prover to the verifier. Indeed, if
the verifier, or optionally the person operating it, could distinguish
a counterfeited prover device from a legitimate one, there would
be no relay attack (in the standard sense of the word). An idea is to
add a biometric identification of the card-holders onboard the cards
and/or readers. Contactless bankcards with fingerprint readers on-
board are being tried out [30], to prevent someone fraudulently
use a contactless card lost by someone else. Note that this measure
alone would not stop relaying altogether, instead it would restrict it
to “online relaying”: the attacker needs to commence the relaying
(from one POS to another) after the fingerprint was read.
A more robust idea would be to add fingerprint-reading onboard
RFID/NFC cards as well as RFID/NFC readers. Presuming robust
biometry and the refusal to operate if the readings do not match
stored biometrics, fingerprint-readings both from card and readers
at once would eliminate the need for distance bounding altogether:
the legitimate holder of the proving device would have to be physi-
cally present for the authentication to be accepted. However, such a
solution is hard to deploy at a large scale (e.g., biometric data is gen-
erally not spread widely and is stored in HSMs which when queried
answer just “yes/no”), ethically debatable and security/privacy sen-
sitive. Small-scale solutions of this type (e.g., in a high-security
small unit) could however be envisaged. Moreover, this approach
would only work for protocols involving humans. Yet, humans only
represent a small portion of the future uses of DB: i.e., with the
advent of autonomous connected vehicles, there will be a great
need for relay protection to prevent maliciously induced accidents.
Mobile (Mutual) Verifiers. In academic DB, verifiers do not move
and the measurements are w.r.t. their fixed location. One chal-
lenge brought about by connected devices is that the verifiers in
DB will constantly change their position. Moreover, both provers
and verifiers would both be mobile and with an acute need for
their authentication and time-measurements to be mutual, a la the
aforementioned [6, 12]. To this end, image an autonomous platoon
of smart, connected cars and constantly measuring the relative
distance between themselves. The challenge of building mutually
authenticated DB with mobile parties appears no mean feet.
Computational Power and Time Measurement. In academic
DB, computation of timed responses is generally constrained to
be as simple as possible, typically a table lookup or a bitwise XOR
between the challenge and some precomputed response bit. The
reason is as follows: if the computation time is large, and even if
this time is predictable, a malicious prover can use more powerful
hardware to respond faster. Additionally, depending on the physical
layer, a mafia-fraud adversary could send messages to the prover
at a higher frequency in order to make the prover respond faster.
Since information is transmitted at the speed of light, an adversary
gaining a few microseconds can cheat by several kilometres.
Yet, we believe that complex response functions should however
be allowed.First, most distance-bounding protocols were designed
for RFID tags, which do indeed have low computational power.
However, today’s relay-counteractions cannot be restricted to the
RFID context. For instance, contactless payments via smartphones
are nowadays common. Additionally, devices which can possibly
embed a large and powerful distance-bounding apparatus also need
relay protection: e.g., warplanes aim to counter the well-known
MIG-in-the-middle [3] attack, in which an enemy plane imperson-
ates an ally one through relaying. Moreover, lightweight crypto-
graphic primitives are gaining interest int the context of the internet
of things. In particular, low-latency ciphers, such as PRINCE [7],
provide “instantaneous encryption”, i.e., encryption within a single
clock cycle. Therefore, we argue that, within a few years, distance
bounding using specialised hardware will be capable of running
protocols using cryptographic primitives in the timed exchanges.
The SimpleDB-Enc Protocol. Lifting the aforementioned assump-
tion that cryptography cannot be used during the timed phase, we
propose a secure distance-bounding protocol called SimpleDB-Enc:
the prover sends a nonce NP , as well as his identity P , the ver-
ifier sends a n-bit challenge C , and the prover replies with R =
Ex (NP ,C ), where E is a symmetric cipher, and x is a shared key.
This protocol provably resists all threats against distance bounding
including terrorist fraud, in the ideal cipher model [34], assuming
the computation of the response is instantaneous or short with
regards to the time bound of the verifier.
4 CONCLUSIONS
We analytically discussed the validity of standard assumptions
w.r.t. DB design-constraints and threat-models. Then, we elaborated
on the future of DB. We also proposed a new simple and secure
high-level design that lifts the important DB assumption of no
cryptographic operations during the timed phase. We believe that
such protocols are the future of DB, alongside other promising
candidates such as quantum distance bounding [1].
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